"""User-authorization methods for ``GatewayRunner``. Extracted from ``gateway/run.py`` as part of the god-file decomposition campaign (``~/.hermes/plans/god-file-decomposition.md``, Phase 3 mechanical mixin lifts). This mixin holds the inbound-message authorization cluster: whether a user/chat is allowed to talk to the agent, the per-adapter DM policy, and the unauthorized-DM behavior. Behavior-neutral: every method is lifted verbatim from ``GatewayRunner``. ``self.*`` calls resolve unchanged via the MRO. Neutral dependencies import at module top; the module-level ``logger`` is imported lazily inside the one method that uses it (``from gateway.run import logger`` resolves at call time, when ``gateway.run`` is fully loaded) so this module never imports ``gateway.run`` at import time -> no import cycle. The lazy import preserves the exact logger name (``"gateway.run"``) so log records are unchanged. """ from __future__ import annotations import os from typing import Optional from gateway.config import Platform from gateway.session import SessionSource from gateway.whatsapp_identity import ( expand_whatsapp_aliases as _expand_whatsapp_auth_aliases, normalize_whatsapp_identifier as _normalize_whatsapp_identifier, ) class GatewayAuthorizationMixin: """User/chat authorization methods for ``GatewayRunner``.""" def _authorization_adapter( self, platform: Optional[Platform], profile: Optional[str] = None, ): """Resolve the live adapter whose intake policy should gate authorization. In multiplex mode, secondary-profile adapters live in ``_profile_adapters[profile]`` while the default/active profile uses ``self.adapters``. ``SessionSource.profile`` selects which map to consult. When a stamped profile has its own adapter registry entry, the default profile's same-platform adapter must not be consulted as a fallback. """ if not platform: return None profile_name = (profile or "").strip() or None if profile_name: profile_adapters = getattr(self, "_profile_adapters", None) or {} if profile_name in profile_adapters: return profile_adapters[profile_name].get(platform) adapters = getattr(self, "adapters", None) or {} return adapters.get(platform) def _adapter_for_source(self, source: Optional[SessionSource]): """Resolve the live adapter for an inbound ``SessionSource``.""" if source is None: return None # ``getattr`` guards test fixtures that build a bare source via # SimpleNamespace and omit ``profile`` (see AGENTS.md pitfall #17). return self._authorization_adapter( getattr(source, "platform", None), getattr(source, "profile", None), ) def _adapter_authorization_is_upstream( self, platform: Optional[Platform], *, profile: Optional[str] = None, ) -> bool: """Whether the adapter for *platform* delegates authz to a trusted upstream. Mirrors ``BasePlatformAdapter.authorization_is_upstream``. The relay adapter sets this True: the Team Gateway connector authenticates the gateway's WS and resolves owner-only author bindings before delivering, so an inbound relay event is already authorized as this instance's bound user. Unlike ``_adapter_enforces_own_access_policy`` (a LOCAL config policy the gateway mirrors only when it's an allowlist), this is an UPSTREAM decision the gateway honors directly. Defaults to ``False`` when the adapter is unknown or doesn't expose the flag. """ if not platform: return False adapter = self._authorization_adapter(platform, profile) if adapter is None: return False return bool(getattr(adapter, "authorization_is_upstream", False)) def _adapter_enforces_own_access_policy( self, platform: Optional[Platform], *, profile: Optional[str] = None, ) -> bool: """Whether the adapter for *platform* gates access at intake itself. Mirrors ``BasePlatformAdapter.enforces_own_access_policy``. Adapters such as WeCom, Weixin, Yuanbao, QQBot, and WhatsApp evaluate their documented ``dm_policy`` / ``group_policy`` / ``allow_from`` config before a message is dispatched to the gateway. The flag alone is NOT "already authorized": these adapters default to ``open``, which forwards every sender, so ``_is_user_authorized`` only trusts the adapter when its effective policy for the chat type is an actual ``allowlist`` restriction (see that method). Defaults to ``False`` when the adapter is unknown or doesn't expose the flag. """ if not platform: return False # Some test helpers build a bare GatewayRunner via object.__new__ and # never set ``adapters``; treat a missing/empty map as "no adapter" # rather than raising (see pitfalls.md #17). adapter = self._authorization_adapter(platform, profile) if adapter is None: return False return bool(getattr(adapter, "enforces_own_access_policy", False)) def _adapter_dm_policy( self, platform: Optional[Platform], *, profile: Optional[str] = None, ) -> str: """Best-effort read of an own-policy adapter's effective DM policy. Returns the lowercased ``dm_policy`` (``"open"`` / ``"allowlist"`` / ``"disabled"`` / ``"pairing"``) for *platform*, or ``""`` when unknown. Prefers the live adapter's resolved ``_dm_policy`` — which already folds in both ``config.extra`` and the ``_DM_POLICY`` env var (the env var is not always bridged back into ``config.extra``) — and falls back to ``config.extra`` for bare runners built without a live adapter. Used by ``_is_user_authorized`` to decide whether an own-policy adapter actually restricted DM senders to a configured allowlist (trustworthy) or merely forwarded everyone under ``dm_policy: open`` / for a pairing handshake (not authorization). "Reached the gateway" only carries an authorization signal in the ``allowlist`` case. """ if not platform: return "" adapter = self._authorization_adapter(platform, profile) policy = getattr(adapter, "_dm_policy", None) if adapter is not None else None if policy is None: config = getattr(self, "config", None) platform_cfg = ( config.platforms.get(platform) if config is not None and hasattr(config, "platforms") else None ) extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None if isinstance(extra, dict): policy = extra.get("dm_policy") return str(policy or "").strip().lower() def _adapter_group_policy( self, platform: Optional[Platform], *, profile: Optional[str] = None, ) -> str: """Best-effort read of an own-policy adapter's effective group policy. Mirror of ``_adapter_dm_policy`` for group / forum / channel traffic: returns the lowercased ``group_policy`` (``"open"`` / ``"allowlist"`` / ``"disabled"``) for *platform*, or ``""`` when unknown. Prefers the live adapter's resolved ``_group_policy`` and falls back to ``config.extra`` for bare runners built without a live adapter. Used by ``_is_user_authorized`` to decide whether an own-policy adapter restricted group senders to a configured allowlist (trustworthy) or forwarded the whole channel under ``group_policy: open`` (not authorization). """ if not platform: return "" adapter = self._authorization_adapter(platform, profile) policy = getattr(adapter, "_group_policy", None) if adapter is not None else None if policy is None: config = getattr(self, "config", None) platform_cfg = ( config.platforms.get(platform) if config is not None and hasattr(config, "platforms") else None ) extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None if isinstance(extra, dict): policy = extra.get("group_policy") return str(policy or "").strip().lower() def _adapter_group_has_sender_allowlist( self, platform: Optional[Platform], chat_id: Optional[str], *, profile: Optional[str] = None, ) -> bool: """Whether a per-group sender allowlist gated this group message. WeCom supports ``groups..allow_from`` on top of the top-level ``group_policy``. A group may be open at the chat level while still restricting which senders inside that group can invoke Hermes. If such a message reached the gateway, the adapter already checked that sender allowlist, so it is a trustworthy intake decision rather than the fail-open ``group_policy: open`` case. """ if not platform or not chat_id: return False adapter = self._authorization_adapter(platform, profile) groups = getattr(adapter, "_groups", None) if adapter is not None else None if groups is None: config = getattr(self, "config", None) platform_cfg = ( config.platforms.get(platform) if config is not None and hasattr(config, "platforms") else None ) extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None if isinstance(extra, dict): groups = extra.get("groups") if not isinstance(groups, dict): return False chat_id_str = str(chat_id) group_cfg = groups.get(chat_id_str) if not isinstance(group_cfg, dict): lowered = chat_id_str.lower() for key, value in groups.items(): if isinstance(key, str) and key.lower() == lowered and isinstance(value, dict): group_cfg = value break if not isinstance(group_cfg, dict): group_cfg = groups.get("*") if not isinstance(group_cfg, dict): return False sender_allow = group_cfg.get("allow_from") or group_cfg.get("allowFrom") if isinstance(sender_allow, str): return bool(sender_allow.strip()) if isinstance(sender_allow, (list, tuple, set)): return any(str(item).strip() for item in sender_allow) return False def _is_user_authorized(self, source: SessionSource) -> bool: """ Check if a user is authorized to use the bot. Checks in order: 1. Per-platform allow-all flag (e.g., DISCORD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true) 2. Environment variable allowlists (TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS, etc.) 3. DM pairing approved list 4. Global allow-all (GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true) 5. Default: deny """ from gateway.run import logger # Home Assistant events are system-generated (state changes), not # user-initiated messages. The HASS_TOKEN already authenticates the # connection, so HA events are always authorized. # Webhook events are authenticated via HMAC signature validation in # the adapter itself — no user allowlist applies. if source.platform in {Platform.HOMEASSISTANT, Platform.WEBHOOK}: return True # Relay (and any adapter whose authorization is enforced by a trusted # authenticated upstream): the Team Gateway connector authenticates this # gateway's WS with a per-instance secret and resolves owner-only author # bindings BEFORE delivering, so an inbound relay event was already # authorized as this instance's bound user (the author id is the one the # connector observed, never gateway-asserted). There is no local # RELAY_ALLOWED_USERS env allowlist to consult, and default-denying for # its absence is the bug this branch fixes. This is delegation to a # trusted upstream, NOT a fail-open: it fires only for an event that was # actually delivered over the authenticated relay WS (the transport # stamps ``delivered_via_upstream_relay``), or whose platform's adapter # explicitly declares ``authorization_is_upstream=True``; every direct # network-exposed adapter leaves the flag False and its events unmarked, # so the env-allowlist default-deny below still applies unchanged. # # The delivery marker is the PRIMARY signal: a relay *message* inbound # carries the UNDERLYING platform (``source.platform`` == discord/…), # NOT ``Platform.RELAY``, because that's what session-keying and egress # need — so keying authz off ``source.platform`` would miss (the relay # adapter is registered under ``Platform.RELAY``) and default-deny the # user ("Unauthorized user on discord"). The adapter-flag check is # retained for events whose ``source.platform`` IS ``Platform.RELAY`` # (e.g. the interaction-passthrough path). # ``is True`` (not just truthiness): the marker is a real bool on a # SessionSource, and an explicit identity check refuses to authorize a # non-bool stand-in (e.g. a MagicMock attribute auto-vivifies truthy in # tests) — defensive against accidental fail-open. if source.delivered_via_upstream_relay is True or self._adapter_authorization_is_upstream( source.platform, profile=source.profile, ): return True user_id = source.user_id # Telegram (and similar) authorize entire group/forum/channel chats # by chat ID via TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS / QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS. # That allowlist is chat-scoped, so it must work even when # source.user_id is None — Telegram emits anonymous-admin posts, # sender_chat traffic, and channel broadcasts with no `from_user`, # and an operator who explicitly listed the chat expects those to # be honored. Run this check before the no-user-id guard below so # documented behavior matches reality # (website/docs/reference/environment-variables.md, # website/docs/user-guide/messaging/telegram.md). if source.chat_type in {"group", "forum", "channel"} and source.chat_id: chat_allowlist_env = { Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS", Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS", }.get(source.platform, "") if chat_allowlist_env: raw_chat_allowlist = os.getenv(chat_allowlist_env, "").strip() if raw_chat_allowlist: allowed_group_ids = { cid.strip() for cid in raw_chat_allowlist.split(",") if cid.strip() } if "*" in allowed_group_ids or source.chat_id in allowed_group_ids: return True # Bots admitted by {PLATFORM}_ALLOW_BOTS bypass the human allowlist (#4466). # Checked before the no-user-id guard below: some platforms deliver # bot/automation traffic with no user_id at all -- e.g. Slack Workflow # Builder posts arrive as subtype=bot_message with user=None -- so # deferring past the guard would reject them outright (the same reason # the chat-scoped allowlist above runs early). platform_allow_bots_map = { Platform.DISCORD: "DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS", Platform.FEISHU: "FEISHU_ALLOW_BOTS", Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_ALLOW_BOTS", Platform.SLACK: "SLACK_ALLOW_BOTS", } if getattr(source, "is_bot", False): allow_bots_var = platform_allow_bots_map.get(source.platform) if allow_bots_var and os.getenv(allow_bots_var, "none").lower().strip() in {"mentions", "all"}: return True if not user_id: return False platform_env_map = { Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.DISCORD: "DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WHATSAPP: "WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WHATSAPP_CLOUD: "WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.SLACK: "SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.SIGNAL: "SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.EMAIL: "EMAIL_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.SMS: "SMS_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.MATTERMOST: "MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.MATRIX: "MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.DINGTALK: "DINGTALK_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.FEISHU: "FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WECOM: "WECOM_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WECOM_CALLBACK: "WECOM_CALLBACK_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WEIXIN: "WEIXIN_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.BLUEBUBBLES: "BLUEBUBBLES_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.YUANBAO: "YUANBAO_ALLOWED_USERS", } platform_group_user_env_map = { Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS", } platform_group_chat_env_map = { Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS", Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS", } platform_allow_all_map = { Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.DISCORD: "DISCORD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.WHATSAPP: "WHATSAPP_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.WHATSAPP_CLOUD: "WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.SLACK: "SLACK_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.SIGNAL: "SIGNAL_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.EMAIL: "EMAIL_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.SMS: "SMS_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.MATTERMOST: "MATTERMOST_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.MATRIX: "MATRIX_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.DINGTALK: "DINGTALK_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.FEISHU: "FEISHU_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.WECOM: "WECOM_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.WECOM_CALLBACK: "WECOM_CALLBACK_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.WEIXIN: "WEIXIN_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.BLUEBUBBLES: "BLUEBUBBLES_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", Platform.YUANBAO: "YUANBAO_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", } # Plugin platforms: check the registry for auth env var names if source.platform not in platform_env_map: try: from gateway.platform_registry import platform_registry entry = platform_registry.get(source.platform.value) if entry: if entry.allowed_users_env: platform_env_map[source.platform] = entry.allowed_users_env if entry.allow_all_env: platform_allow_all_map[source.platform] = entry.allow_all_env except Exception: pass # Per-platform allow-all flag (e.g., DISCORD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true) platform_allow_all_var = platform_allow_all_map.get(source.platform, "") if platform_allow_all_var and os.getenv(platform_allow_all_var, "").lower() in {"true", "1", "yes"}: return True # Adapter-verified role auth: the Discord adapter already confirmed the # user holds a role in DISCORD_ALLOWED_ROLES before dispatching the message. # Compare with ``is True`` so the real bool field authorizes while a # MagicMock source (test fixtures using ``object.__new__`` runners with # mock sources) does not auto-truthy through this gate (see pitfall #13). if getattr(source, "role_authorized", False) is True: return True # Check pairing store. A pairing entry is a first-class authorization # grant, created only by a trusted operator approving a pairing code # (hermes gateway pairing approve / the authenticated dashboard) — an # inbound sender can never reach approve_code, so this is not an # attacker-controlled path. Honored as a UNION with the allowlist: a # paired user is authorized regardless of the allowlist, and when an # allowlist IS configured, operator approval also writes the user into # that allowlist (see PairingStore._approve_user), keeping a single # operator-visible source of truth. (#23778: the original bypass was the # inbound message/approval-button gate, not this grant; that gate is # fixed separately.) platform_name = source.platform.value if source.platform else "" if self.pairing_store.is_approved(platform_name, user_id): return True # Check platform-specific and global allowlists platform_allowlist = os.getenv(platform_env_map.get(source.platform, ""), "").strip() group_user_allowlist = "" group_chat_allowlist = "" if source.chat_type in {"group", "forum"}: group_user_allowlist = os.getenv(platform_group_user_env_map.get(source.platform, ""), "").strip() group_chat_allowlist = os.getenv(platform_group_chat_env_map.get(source.platform, ""), "").strip() global_allowlist = os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS", "").strip() if not platform_allowlist and not group_user_allowlist and not group_chat_allowlist and not global_allowlist: # No env allowlist configured. Adapters that own their own # config-driven access policy (dm_policy / group_policy / # allow_from / group_allow_from) gate access at intake, so for those # platforms we can honor the adapter's decision instead of the # env-only default-deny below -- but ONLY when that decision was an # actual allowlist restriction. # # The adapters default dm_policy / group_policy to "open", which # forwards EVERY sender. Reading "reached the gateway" as # authorization in that case would admit the whole external network # with no operator-configured allowlist -- the fail-open SECURITY.md # §2.6 forbids ("an allowlist is required for every enabled # network-exposed adapter ... code paths that fail open when no # allowlist is configured are code bugs"). "disabled" never # forwards, and "pairing" forwards unpaired DMs only so the gateway # can run its pairing handshake (the pairing-store check above # already denied this sender). So trust the adapter only when its # effective policy for THIS chat type is "allowlist"; for "open" / # "pairing" / anything else, fall through to default-deny, where # GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS, the per-platform {PLATFORM}_ALLOW_ALL_USERS # flag (checked above), and the pairing flow remain the explicit # opt-ins to broader access. (#34515 follow-up: trusting "open" was a # fail-open.) if self._adapter_enforces_own_access_policy( source.platform, profile=source.profile, ): if source.chat_type in {"group", "forum", "channel"}: effective_policy = self._adapter_group_policy( source.platform, profile=source.profile, ) if self._adapter_group_has_sender_allowlist( source.platform, source.chat_id, profile=source.profile, ): return True else: effective_policy = self._adapter_dm_policy( source.platform, profile=source.profile, ) if effective_policy == "allowlist": return True # No allowlists configured -- check global allow-all flag return os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "").lower() in {"true", "1", "yes"} # Telegram can optionally authorize group traffic by chat ID. # Keep this separate from TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS, which gates # the sender user ID for group/forum messages. if group_chat_allowlist and source.chat_type in {"group", "forum"} and source.chat_id: allowed_group_ids = { chat_id.strip() for chat_id in group_chat_allowlist.split(",") if chat_id.strip() } if "*" in allowed_group_ids or source.chat_id in allowed_group_ids: return True # Backward-compat shim for #15027: prior to PR #17686, # TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS was (mis)used as a chat-ID allowlist. # Values starting with "-" are Telegram chat IDs, not user IDs, so if # users still have those in TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS we honor them # as chat IDs and warn once. The correct var is now # TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS. if ( source.platform == Platform.TELEGRAM and group_user_allowlist and source.chat_type in {"group", "forum"} and source.chat_id ): legacy_chat_ids = { v.strip() for v in group_user_allowlist.split(",") if v.strip().startswith("-") } if legacy_chat_ids: if not getattr(self, "_warned_telegram_group_users_legacy", False): logger.warning( "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS contains chat-ID-shaped values " "(%s). Treating them as chat IDs for backward compatibility. " "Move chat IDs to TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS — the _USERS var " "is now for sender user IDs.", ",".join(sorted(legacy_chat_ids)), ) self._warned_telegram_group_users_legacy = True if source.chat_id in legacy_chat_ids: return True # Check if user is in any allowlist. In group/forum chats, # TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS is the scoped allowlist and should not # imply DM access; TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS remains the platform-wide # allowlist and still works everywhere for backward compatibility. allowed_ids = set() if platform_allowlist: allowed_ids.update(uid.strip() for uid in platform_allowlist.split(",") if uid.strip()) if group_user_allowlist: allowed_ids.update(uid.strip() for uid in group_user_allowlist.split(",") if uid.strip()) if global_allowlist: allowed_ids.update(uid.strip() for uid in global_allowlist.split(",") if uid.strip()) # "*" in any allowlist means allow everyone (consistent with # SIGNAL_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS precedent) if "*" in allowed_ids: return True check_ids = {user_id} if "@" in user_id: check_ids.add(user_id.split("@")[0]) # WhatsApp: resolve phone↔LID aliases from bridge session mapping files if source.platform == Platform.WHATSAPP: normalized_allowed_ids = set() for allowed_id in allowed_ids: normalized_allowed_ids.update(_expand_whatsapp_auth_aliases(allowed_id)) if normalized_allowed_ids: allowed_ids = normalized_allowed_ids check_ids.update(_expand_whatsapp_auth_aliases(user_id)) normalized_user_id = _normalize_whatsapp_identifier(user_id) if normalized_user_id: check_ids.add(normalized_user_id) # SimpleX: SIMPLEX_ALLOWED_USERS accepts either the numeric contactId # or the contact's display name. The adapter sets user_id=contactId for # stability across renames, but the SimpleX UI never surfaces the # numeric id — operators only see display names, so that's what they # naturally put in the env var. Match both so the allowlist works # regardless of which form was chosen. # Plugin platform: compare by value since Platform.SIMPLEX is not a # hardcoded enum member (it's a dynamic plugin platform). if ( source.platform is not None and source.platform.value == "simplex" and source.user_name ): check_ids.add(source.user_name) return bool(check_ids & allowed_ids) def _get_unauthorized_dm_behavior( self, platform: Optional[Platform], *, profile: Optional[str] = None, ) -> str: """Return how unauthorized DMs should be handled for a platform. Resolution order: 1. Explicit per-platform ``unauthorized_dm_behavior`` in config — always wins. 2. Email defaults to ``"ignore"`` unless explicitly opted into pairing. Inboxes may contain arbitrary unread human messages, so replying with pairing codes is not a safe platform default. 3. Explicit global ``unauthorized_dm_behavior`` in config — wins for chat-shaped platforms when no per-platform override is set. 4. When an adapter-level DM policy opts into pairing or silent drop, honor it. 5. When an allowlist (``PLATFORM_ALLOWED_USERS``, ``PLATFORM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS`` / ``PLATFORM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS``, or ``GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS``) is configured, default to ``"ignore"`` — the allowlist signals that the owner has deliberately restricted access; spamming unknown contacts with pairing codes is both noisy and a potential info-leak. (#9337) 6. No allowlist and no explicit config → ``"pair"`` (open-gateway default). """ config = getattr(self, "config", None) # Check for an explicit per-platform override first. if config and hasattr(config, "get_unauthorized_dm_behavior") and platform: platform_cfg = config.platforms.get(platform) if hasattr(config, "platforms") else None if platform_cfg and "unauthorized_dm_behavior" in getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", {}): # Operator explicitly configured behavior for this platform — respect it. return config.get_unauthorized_dm_behavior(platform) # Email is inbox-shaped, not chat-shaped: an agent mailbox may contain # unrelated unread human email. Require an explicit per-platform # ``unauthorized_dm_behavior: pair`` opt-in before replying to unknown # senders with pairing codes. Keep this before the global fallback to # match GatewayConfig.get_unauthorized_dm_behavior(). if platform == Platform.EMAIL: return "ignore" # Check for an explicit global config override. if config and hasattr(config, "unauthorized_dm_behavior"): if config.unauthorized_dm_behavior != "pair": # non-default → explicit override return config.unauthorized_dm_behavior # Config-driven dm_policy (WeCom / Weixin / Yuanbao / QQBot). An # allowlist or disabled DM policy means the operator restricted access, # so unauthorized DMs should be dropped silently rather than answered # with a pairing code. An explicit pairing policy opts back into codes. # Prefer the profile-scoped live adapter's resolved policy in multiplex # mode; fall back to the default profile's config.extra. if platform: dm_policy = self._adapter_dm_policy(platform, profile=profile) if not dm_policy and config and hasattr(config, "platforms"): platform_cfg = config.platforms.get(platform) extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None if isinstance(extra, dict): dm_policy = str(extra.get("dm_policy") or "").strip().lower() if dm_policy == "pairing": return "pair" if dm_policy in {"allowlist", "disabled"}: return "ignore" # No explicit override. Fall back to allowlist-aware default: # if any allowlist is configured for this platform, silently drop # unauthorized messages instead of sending pairing codes. if platform: platform_env_map = { Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.DISCORD: "DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WHATSAPP: "WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WHATSAPP_CLOUD: "WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.SLACK: "SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.SIGNAL: "SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.EMAIL: "EMAIL_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.SMS: "SMS_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.MATTERMOST: "MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.MATRIX: "MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.DINGTALK: "DINGTALK_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.FEISHU: "FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WECOM: "WECOM_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WECOM_CALLBACK: "WECOM_CALLBACK_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.WEIXIN: "WEIXIN_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.BLUEBUBBLES: "BLUEBUBBLES_ALLOWED_USERS", Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_ALLOWED_USERS", } platform_group_env_map = { Platform.TELEGRAM: ( "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS", "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS", ), Platform.QQBOT: ("QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS",), } if os.getenv(platform_env_map.get(platform, ""), "").strip(): return "ignore" for env_key in platform_group_env_map.get(platform, ()): if os.getenv(env_key, "").strip(): return "ignore" if os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS", "").strip(): return "ignore" return "pair"